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Abstract: Foreign policy is the methods and means used by a nation-State to 
achieve its aims and interests in its relations with other nation-States. In the 
conduct of foreign policy, the main objective is to protect the security of the 
State, improve the political, social and economic well-being of the citizenry. 
Therefore, the paper questioned Nigeria’s foreign policy and how it affected 
her external relations during the two military regimes of General Buhari, 
1983-1985 and, General Babangida, 1985-1993. General Buhari’s foreign 
policy decision to closed Nigeria’s borders with her neighbouring West 
African countries strained her relationship with them. General Babangida’s 
cancellation of the June 12, 1993 national election results dented Nigeria’s 
image globally. The paper’s methodology was based on secondary sources. 
The paper further observed that the Buhari regime inherited the deepening 
economic crisis, which Nigeria was engulfed in during the civilian 
administration of Shehu Shagari. Therefore, in order to revamp the economy, 
the Buhari regime emphasized that Nigeria’s foreign policy would revolve 
around its national security and economic well-being of Nigerians.The 
Babangida’s regime foreign policy was more African-focused. The regime 
gave assistance to some African liberation movements for the struggle of 
their independence. This led to the liberation of  Namibia, Mozambique from 
colonial rule. Equally, the Babangida regime restored peace and order in the 
Liberian civil war. The paper also found out that the Buhari regime 
conducted external relations with a retaliation reactions policy, while the 
Babangida regime used skillful and economic diplomacy in its foreign policy 
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conduct. It concludes that both military regimes never had any regards to the 
fundamental human rights of the citizenry. 
 
Key words: Foreign Policy, Military Junta, Diplomatic Relations, Retaliation 
Reactions, Economic Diplomacy. 
 
Introduction 
Much of the foundation of what we 
know as Nigeria’s foreign policy 
since independence in 1960 is directly 
owed to vision of Alhaji Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first Prime 
Minister and Head of Government, 
October 1960 to January1966. As the 
Head of the self-government from the 
late 1950s, he carefully articulated 
and enunciated the fundamental 
principles that would underpin the 
country’s external relations after 
independence, and established the 
basis on which Nigeria would relate 
with all countries, big and small, as 
well as what would be its attitude 
towards international organizations. 
These visions were spelt out in major 
speeches, especially from 1958 when 
the date of independence had been set 
for October 1960. It was from that 
movement on that the man who would 
be the country’s first Head of 
Government had been expressing his 
views concretely on foreign policy 
and indicating the direction of his 
thoughts on diverse issues of world 
politics (Fawole, 2003:38). 
 
Similarly, a review of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy positions over the years 
does point up a number of 
philosophical-conceptual building 
blocks which are strongly related to 
the state of the international 
environment. Within the context of 
decolonization, “self-determination 
and self-government” were core 
philosophical principles that informed 
the country’s foreign policy. As the 
country matured as an independent 
and sovereign nation, other 
philosophical principles that became 
part of Nigeria’s foreign policy 
fundamentals are enlightened national 
interest, African solidarity, 
interdependence, inter nationalism, 
asymmetric world order and 
supranational authority (Ogwu, 
2005:7). 
 
The pursuit of Nigerian foreign policy 
began in earnest after the attainment 
of independence on October 1, 1960. 
In the foreign policy statements made 
in August and December, 1960 
respectively, the first Prime Minister 
of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa, outlined some objectives of 
the country’s foreign policy. These 
objectives or goals of the Nigerian 
foreign policy have consequently been 
maintained despite numerous changes 
in government. At independence, the 
country’s foreign policy sought to 
achieve the following objectives: 
promotion of the economic well-being 
of Nigerians and Africans; promotion 
of Nigeria’s territorial integrity, 
eradication of all forms of racism and 
colonialism from African continent; 
promotion of the rights of black men 
all over the world; and promotion of 
international peace and security 
(Ogwu, 1986:8; Olusanya and 
Akindele, 1986:3-5). 
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On January 15, 1966 the military 
swept away the Balewa government 
in a bloody coup led by Major 
Kaduna Nzeogwu, saw the murder of 
the Prime Minister A.T.Balewa, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the 
Northern Region and Chief Samuel 
Ladoke, the Premier of the Western 
Region. This coup ushered in the 
military junta of General Aguyi-
Ironsiwhich only lasted for six 
months. The General Ironsi 
administration was overthrown in a 
bloodier military coup of July29, 
1966 which brought in Yakubu 
Gowon, then, a Lieutenant Colonel in 
the Nigerian Army as the new Head 
of State.General Gowon was 
overthrown in a military coup on July 
29,1975 which ushered in the 
dynamic and radically inclined 
government of General Murtala 
Ramat Muhammed. General Murtala 
Mohammed was assassinated on 
February 13,1976 in a military coup 
attempt. His Deputy, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo became Head of 
State. He ruled from 1976-1979 when 
he transmitted power to the 
democratically elected government of 
President Shehu Shagari. President 
Shagari was succeeded by General 
Muhammadu Buhari in a military 
coup on December 31, 1983. At this 
point, it is imperative to make a 
preamble of the Buhari and 
Babangida military juntas so as to 
have a discernable thesis. 
 
The Buhari military  junta equally re-
launched Nigeria’s commitment to the 
freedom and liberation struggle of 
African countries still under the 
minority white supremacists rule, 
especially in South Africa. General 
Buhari continued with Shehu Shagari, 
his immediate predecessor policy of 
expulsion of illegal aliens of 
neighbouring West African origin as 
well as the closure of its borders with 
her West African neighbouring 
countries to stem or stop the influx of 
illegal goods into Nigeria and 
currency trafficking. Thus, this 
severed Nigeria’s relationship with 
her neighbouring West African 
countries. Again, Nigeria’s diplomatic 
relations with Britain was sour during 
General Buhari’s reign. General 
Buhari military led government lasted 
for only twenty months. He was 
overthrown in a military coup on 
August 27, 1985 which ushered in 
General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida 
as the self-acclaimed “Military 
President” of Nigeria. 
 
The military junta of General 
Babangida is known to have 
successfully brought peace to the 
Liberian civil war and liberated some 
African countries from colonial rule 
such as Namibia to a state of 
independence. During this period, 
Nigeria assumed the ‘Big Brother’ 
role of peace making on the African 
continent and became a major donor 
nation in Africa. General Babangida 
annulled the June 12, 1993 
presidential election results. This led 
to protest by Nigerians and the United 
States of America and the European 
Union threatened sanctions on 
Nigeria. General Babangida ruled 
Nigeria until August 26, 1993. 
Therefore, this paper examines 
Nigeria’s foreign policy under the 
Buhari and Babangida military 
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regimes, and made a comparison of 
the Buhari and Babangida military 
juntas, and draws a conclusion. 
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under 
Muhammadu Buhari Regime, 1983-
1985 
What turned out to be the Buhari 
regimes foreign policy throughout its 
twenty-months tenure was defined by 
both the circumstances that preceded 
is entry into power as well as the 
texture and tone of General Buhari’s 
inaugural address to Nigerians on 
December 31, 1983. Delivered in a 
tone that suggested seriousness, 
Buhari made the nation to believe that 
the deposed civilian experiment had 
gone completely awry after only four 
years, almost destroying the nation in 
the process. His tone suggested the 
arrival of a regime that was set to 
correct the fatal errors of the ousted 
civilian administration. He asserted, 
without mincing words, that Nigerians 
had no other country that they could 
call their own and thus that all hands 
would have to be on deck to salvage it 
together. It was this tough broadcast 
that set the tone for the subsequent 
inflexible and uncompromising 
foreign policy postures that 
distinguished the regime (Fawole, 
2003). 
 
It is fair to assert that General Buhari 
was not a novice both in terms of 
administration and foreign policy. He 
was a prominent member of both the 
Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun 
Obasanjo regimes, having served 
variously as Military Administration 
of Borno State and later a Federal 
Commissioner for Petroleum. The 
latter post must have given him 
greater exposure to the intricacies and 
intrigues of global energy politics in 
particular and international diplomacy 
in general Apparently, because of the 
centrality of foreign policy to the 
administration, General Buhari 
appointed Dr. Ibrahim Agboola 
Gambari, an International Relations 
lecturer and Director–General of the 
Nigerian Institute of International 
Affairs (NIIA) as Minister of External 
Affairs and  Major–General Joseph  
Garba, as Permanent Representative 
at the UN in New York. General 
Garba was the flamboyant 
Commissioner for External Affairs 
during the Muhammed and Obasanjo 
regimes from 1975-1978, a period of 
intense diplomatic activism that saw 
Nigeria emerging as the primus inter 
pares on the continent. It was 
therefore, thought that the declaration 
of being an offshoot of the last two 
military regimes and the appointment 
of two knowledgeable men into the 
sensitive diplomatic portfolios 
signified a new era of return to a 
dynamic and activist foreign policy 
(Fawole, 2003). 
 
The usurpation of power by General 
Buhari was in many ways an 
important crossroad for Nigeria, 
primarily in domestic policy but also 
in external relations. According to 
him, “no country in the world can 
command the respect and admiration 
of the international community 
without a dedicated purposeful 
leadership and indeed, no country can 
conduct a successful foreign policy 
without its putting first, house in 
order” (Buhari, 1994). Therefore, in 
order to succeed in achieving a 
    68 
 





change in the foreign policy, the 
regime believed that the starting point 
should be to revamp the economy 
first. Understandably, throughout its 
existence, the Buhari regime focused 
its attention and effort at economic 
recovery. That is why the regime 
further affirmed that: Federal 
government will maintain and 
strengthen existing diplomatic 
relations with other States and with 
international organizations… we also 
honour and respect all treaty 
obligations entered into by the 
previous government (Mbachu, 1996).  
 
The regime went further in an address 
to a world press conference a few 
days after its emergence to assure 
foreign investors and the Western 
powers especially of the security of 
their investments. As General Buhari 
announced: “I wish to re-affirm that 
Nigeria will continue to honour its 
international commitments at 
multilateral and bi-lateral levels. We 
shall maintain cordial relations with 
friendly countries based on mutual 
respect, sovereign equality and non-
interference in the internal affairs of 
each other” (Mbachu, 1996).  
 
The first major foreign policy issue 
that the new Buhari regime had to 
deal with was actually an outgrowth 
of domestic policy, that is, revamping 
the ailing national economy. This is 
because it inherited severely damaged 
economy and its main objective was 
to put it back on track. It also 
inherited the proposal to seek an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
bail out facility of $2.2 billion from 
its predecessor to provide badly 
needed economic relief. The amount 
was expected to cushion the impact of 
a badly depleted national treasury and 
the considerable reduced revenues 
from crude oil. There was a ray of 
hope that the resumption of 
negotiations with IMF would 
eventually result in some much 
needed economic relief. But it would 
appear that the initial optimism for 
approachment with the IMF was sadly 
misplaced. Negotiations between the 
IMF and the Buhari government could 
not progress as smoothly as initially 
anticipated because of disagreement 
over the conditionalities that the 
lending institution attached to the loan 
facility (Fawole, 2003). 
 
The IMF conditionalities involves 
thus: “A review and curtailment of 
public expenditures , reduction of 
government subsidies, classification 
of parastatals into ‘economic’ and 
‘social’ categories,  stoppage of non-
statutory transfers such as loans to 
State governments, simplification and 
rationalization of tariff  structure, 
review of interest rates, vigorous 
export promotion, relaxation of 
import restrictions, and devaluation of 
the naira” (cited in Fawole, 2003).  
 
Research studies have it that, the 
above IMF conditionalities were 
unaccepted by the Buhari military 
government. In his words, General 
Buhari said:“We have realized the 
damage IMF loans have done to 
developing countries. None of the 
developing countries that have taken 
IMF loans have come out of it well. 
So if we are to go by historical 
indications, to take IMF loan on the 
terms they want us to, will be 
tantamount to virtually destroying our 
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own country. Devaluation does not 
make sense to Nigerians at all. 
Equally, according to Gambari 
(1989:32), these conditionalities 
would merely worsen rather than 
improve the state of health of the 
economy, and that there was no 
developing country that took IMF 
loans on those standard 
conditionalities without severe 
damage to its economy. 
 
According to academic studies, the 
Buhari regime promulgated a number 
of draconian Decrees with the aim of 
tackling the corruption malady in 
Nigeria. These Decrees prescribed 
harsh penalties for offenders such as 
death by firing squad for drug 
trafficking, illegal oil bunkering, 
tampering with electricity and NEPA 
installation among others. There was 
also a Decree that prohibited the 
publication or disclosure of 
government information that could 
embarrass it. In other words, the 
Decree was an anti-press legislation 
against the free flow of information. 
 
Equally, according to Tyona (2019), a 
cross section of political gladiators 
were convicted of different corrupt 
practices under the government of 
General Buhari. The regime also 
condemned a number of Nigerians 
involved in drug trafficking to death 
and executed by firing squad. 
 
The Buhari administration believed 
that the old conception of Africa 
being the policy center-piece would 
be properly defined. Under Buhari’s 
regime, relations with Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) member-States reached 
an all time low. Not only were the 
nation’s borders permanently closed 
against its neighbours, thus badly 
hurting their economies, the regime 
did not heed all the appeals, for them 
to be re-opened. The position of the 
Buhari regime’s foreign policy toward 
its neighbours has been justified in 
literature as promised on the basic 
rationale behind the coup itself, which 
was to arrest the country’s rapidly 
deteriorating economic situation, 
eliminate corruption and improve the 
well-being of the generality of 
Nigerians (cited in Tyona and 
Abagen, 2019). 
 
The regime took a few important 
foreign policy steps with significant 
implications for Africa as a whole. 
For example, the regime recognized 
the Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR) as an independent 
nation in Africa notwithstanding 
protests from Morocco. This was 
quite different from Shagari’s regime 
posture. The Buhari’s regime also 
pledged to support the OAU’s effort 
in general towards the liberation 
struggle in Southern Africa. In the 
same vein, the regime pledged 
Nigeria’s direct assistance to Angola, 
Mozambique and liberation struggles 
in South Africa and Namibia 
(Mbachu, 2011:160). 
 
In another development, in order to 
attract Western foreign investors, the 
regime gradually reversed the 
indigenization policy and Decrees. 
The regime spent high proportion of 
the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings on external debt servicing. 
The regime also embarked on counter 
trade with such Western countries as 
Italy, Canada, Brazil, France, and 
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Austria. This practice would not have 
been bad, but for the fact that the 
country had only oil to bater with, 
such that it was in such a weak 
position that the regime virtually was 
begging these Western countries to 
accept oil at a dangerously low rate 
vis-à-vis the high rates of these other 
countries goods and services 
(Mbachu, 2011). 
 
In another dimension, relations with 
Britain were adversely affected during 
the General Muhammadu Buhari 
military junta. Texts have it that the 
soured relations came as a result of 
the regime attempted the 
kidnap/abduction of Nigeria’s former 
Minister of Transportation, Umaru 
Dikko from London with the aid of 
Nigerian officials and Israeli’s 
mercenaries. The Buhari’s 
government denied any involvement 
in the botched kidnap. Sources further 
reveals that this led to the British 
government to seized and detained the 
Nigerian Airways Boeing 707 cargo 
plane that was waiting to convey 
Umaru Dikko back to Nigerian soil 
and equally, the British government 
announced the expulsion of the 
Nigerian Counselor and Attaché from 
Britain. In its usual tit-for-tat manner, 
the General Muhammadu Buhari led 
military junta retaliated by seizing a 
British plane en route London with 
over two hundred passengers and a 
crew of over twenty and also expelled 
the British High Commissioner and 
Attaché in Nigeria and demanded the 
two diplomats to leave the Nigerian 
soil effectively immediately. 
 
In addition, according to Fawole 
(2003) Nigeria was still reeling in the 
diplomatic brouhaha and bad publicity 
that attended the Dikko kidnap when 
it was suddenly jolted again by the 
visit of two prominent traditional 
rulers to Israel in August, 1984. The 
Ooni of Ife, Oba Okunade Sijuwade, 
and the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado 
Bayero, had reportedly paid an 
innocuous private business visit to 
Israel, but the visit generated 
considerable diplomatic headache. 
The two traditional rulers, although 
visiting Israel in their private 
capacities, were reportedly received in 
audience by the then Israeli President 
Chiam Herzog, Prime Minister 
Yitzhaq Shamir and other senior 
Israeli government officials who were 
anxious to capitalize on the event for 
political mileage. This official 
reception was widely publicized in the 
Israeli and international media as 
Nigeria’s surreptitious attempt to 
reopen diplomatic relations that was 
severed in compliance with OAU 
directive in 1973. This visit and the 
attendant adverse publicity justifiably 
incurred the anger of the government 
which promptly suspended the two 
rulers as Chairmen of their respective 
State Councils of Traditional Rulers 
for six months, restricted them to their 
domains and asked them to surrender 
their passports to their local 
government authorities. These actions 
sent strong signals that government 
did not condone their naive attempt to 
conduct diplomacy on its behalf. In 
the first instance, they had no mandate 
to conduct diplomacy on behalf of the 
Nigerian government, at least not on 
such a highly sensitive matter as 
recognition of Israel.General 
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Muhammadu Buhari military junta 
came to an end on August 27, 1985 
via a military coup led by his Chief of 
Army Staff, Major-General Ibrahim 
Badamasi Babangida. 
 
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under 
Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida 
Regime, 1985-1993.  
General Babangida took over power 
from General Buhari on August 27, 
1985. And became the sixth military 
Head of State in Nigeria. In fact, 
studies have it that, he declared 
himself “Military President”, hence 
became the first in Africa and 
probably the world (Tyona and 
Abagen, 2019). 
 
The manner and style of foreign 
policy implementation is one area in 
which the Babangida regime 
distinguished itself from its 
predecessors. While still retaining the 
essentially Afrocentric focus there 
was a clear emphasis on the need to 
relate foreign policy to the domestic 
economic situation.This is important 
to note because, at the time the 
Babangida regime assumed office on 
August 27, 1985, the Nigerian 
domestic environment was 
characterized by several adverse 
developments which had 
repercussions for the conduct of 
foreign policy. For instance, at the 
level of the economy, the collapse in 
the early 1980s to the world oil 
market had drastic consequences for 
the country. Regrettably, the world oil 
market crash came at a time when 
Nigeria had come to depend on oil 
exports for some 90 percent of its 
foreign exchange. At political level, 
the highly authoritarian posture 
adopted by the Buhari regime, his 
blatant suppression of basic 
democratic rights, including the 
freedom of speech and of the press, 
and the total refusal of that 
government to discuss the country’s 
political future with a view to setting 
a date for the return to civilian rule, 
furtherundermined the country’s 
image. All these and others help to 
mould and shape the foreign policy 
posture of President Ibrahim 
Babangida (Mbachu, 2011). 
 
Therefore, the regime of Babangida 
set out early to repair the damages 
done to Nigeria’s foreign policy by 
the Buhari administration. Both the 
IMF loan stalemate and the frosty 
relations with the West were quickly 
resolved. Nigeria soon resumed its 
diplomatic relations with Britain. In 
the same spirit, the closure of 
Nigeria’s borders with her neighbours 
together with the vexing issue of 
illegal aliens, which had converged to 
worsen relations between Nigeria and 
her neighbours were astutely reversed 
to the admiration of West African 
countries, culminating in the 
provision of economic assistance to 
these countries, which won him the 
Chairmanship of ECOWAS for three 
consecutive terms (cited in Fayomi et 
al, 2015). 
 
In essence, this era only marked a 
high point of the country’s rising 
international profile; it also conferred 
commensurate prestige to Nigeria in 
her foreign policy. The success of 
Babangida’s foreign policy initiative 
was attributed to the crop of 
intellectuals who he assembled as 
members of his “kitchen cabinet”. 
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Among them were personalities such 
as Eliagwu, Obiozor, Ofoegbu, 
Akinyemi, Chime, Olagunju, 
Oyovbaire, Ogunsawo, Oshuntokun, 
among others. Despite the remarkable 
contributions to Nigeria’s foreign 
policy by these intellectual giants, the 
foreign policy arena under Babangida 
nonetheless, suffered great confusion 
and incoherence resulting in the 
arbitrary change in the Ministers of 
External Affairs (cited in Fayomi et 
al, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, this confusion was 
greatly reflected in the regimes bid to 
elevate religion as a conscious guide 
to Nigeria’s foreign policy. This was 
demonstrated by the circumstances 
that surrounded Nigeria’s membership 
of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in 1987. The 
regime decided to change Nigeria’s 
status from that of an observer status 
to a full-fledged member without due 
consideration of both domestic and 
international concerns. The direct 
result of this was a serious and lasting 
dent on the regime’s credibility. For 
instance, the decision by Babangida to 
make Nigeria a full member of a 
largely Islamic grouping of States 
generated considerable opposition at 
home and remains one of the most 
highly contentious and unresolved 
issues in the country till date (cited in 
Fayomi et al, 2015). The Babangida 
military juntas according to sources 
also restored diplomatic relations with 
Israel and allow them toestablishing a 
diplomatic presence in Lagos without 
reciprocal presence in Tel Aviv, and 
limited the Israeli Ambassador’s 
movements to only the Southern part 
of the country. 
 
Again, the Babangida administration 
from onset, made plain its 
commitment to pursue with vigour 
Nigeria’s foreign policy principle of 
regarding Africa as the centre – piece 
of our foreign policy. Within this 
overall framework, many important 
innovations were introduced by the 
government in order to enable it carry 
out more effective and relevant role in 
Africa. They include: (a) The 
employment of economic diplomacy 
as a reliable instrument of foreign 
policy. Economic diplomacy was 
intended to open up business 
opportunities for Nigerians in other 
countries, (b) The introduction and 
extension of Technical Aid Corps 
(TAC) scheme. Under the scheme, 
Nigerian professionals and experts 
whose services were required by other 
African countries were seconded, at 
the Nigerian government’s expense, 
to those countries for a period of up to 
three years,(c)The introduction of the 
principle of reciprocity whereby, 
without prejudice to the centrality of 
Africa to Nigeria’s foreign policy, the 
government would make it a point to 
consult only with African 
governments which seek Nigeria’s 
opinion and views on matters that 
concern them individually or 
collectively, (d) The conclusion of 
bilateral agreements with as many 
African countries as were willing, to 
institutionalize their cooperation with 
Nigeria, (e) The strengthening of 
Nigeria’s commitment to regional 
economic cooperation in Africa, (f) 
The intensification of the anti-
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apartheid goals against the racist 
South Africa, (g) The Nigerian 
commitment to African regional 
organization, especially the OAU and 
the African Development Bank 
(ADB), (h) The willingness to 
intervene directly in violet conflicts 
between African States and within 
specific countries as a neutral arbiter 
and honest broker. Formation and 
sponsorship of ECOWAS Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone are handy examples 
(Mbachu,2011). 
 
Equally, the Babangida military junta 
gave moral, financial, diplomatic, and 
material support to Namibia which 
were critical in winning her 
independence under South West 
Africa People’s Organization 
(SWAPO) in 1990. Apart from all the 
resources given to SWAPO to 
prosecute the war of liberation, the 
Nigerian government also gave 
Namibia specific 
assistanceimmediately before and 
after independence to enable the new 
state start off smoothly. These 
include: (a) The sum of N100 million 
(US $11 million) voluntary donations 
by Nigerians raised at the launching 
of the Nambia Solidarity Fund by 
President Babangida, (b) Payment of 
US $400,000.00 assessed contribution 
to the OAU to aid SWAPO’s electoral 
campaign in 1989, (c) Voluntary 
contribution of US $100,000.00 to the 
UN for the repatriation of Namibian 
refugees and exiles to participate in 
the democratization process, (d) 
Payment of US $162,674.00 million 
to assess contribution to the budget of 
the UN Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG), (e) Contribution of 
personnel to perform electoral and 
police duties (cited in Abagen and 
Tyona, 2018).   
In addition, according to Mbachu 
(2011) just as its African policy, the 
Babangida regime’s actions and 
policy towards the Black people in the 
Diaspora contained important 
elements of innovation and continuity. 
The regime with such influential 
members of the Black in the Diaspora 
as members of the 
BlackCongressional Caucus of the 
United States and the government of 
Jamaica in its bid to co-ordinate Black 
peoples response to the problem of 
apartheid in South Africa, especially 
after the rise of power of F.W de 
Klerk. But the most important new 
policy measure adopted by the 
Nigerian government and which is of 
considerable interest to the entire 
black world is the decision to 
campaign vigorously for reparation to 
be paid by the West for the 
enslavement of Blacks. 
 
In another development, the regime of 
General Babangida is seen as the body 
that legalized corruption. His 
administration refused to give account 
of the Gulf War windfall, which is 
estimated to be $12.4 billion (Tyona, 
2019). In the final analysis, according 
to Tyona and Abagen (2019) 
following the country’s debilitating 
transition programme by the 
Babangida government, it became 
evident when the June 12, 1993 
presidential election was annulled. To 
stem the ugly tide, he hurriedly put in 
place an Interim National 
Government, headed by Ernest 
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Shonekan who lasted for about three 
months. 
 
A Comparison of the Buhari 
Regime Foreign Policy with the 
Babangida Regime Foreign Policy  
Foreign policy can be seen as a set of 
carefully articulated goals, aims and 
interest used by a nation-State to 
guide its actions and conduct with 
other nation-States or multi-lateral 
public institutions or organizations in 
the international or global arena. The 
foregoing assertion entails that foreign 
policy is carried out by the 
government in power. On this basis 
therefore, the Buhari and the 
Babangida regimes are similar in 
nature and character, because both 
were military juntas. 
 
One practical difference is that the 
Buhari regime conducted external 
relations by a policy of retaliation 
reactions (tit-for-tat). While the 
Babangida regime conducted its 
foreign policy through skillful 
diplomacy. Babangida equally 
employed economic diplomacy to 
revitalize Nigeria’s economy. Another 
difference is that the Buhari regime 
tackled the official corruption malady 
facing Nigeria. He jailed corrupt 
government officials. While the 
Babangida regime legalized 
corruption. 
Again, the difference is that President 
Babangida single handedly changed 
Nigeria’s status from that of an 
observer status to a full member of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference 
(OIC). While, the Buhari regime 
strongly objected to full membership 
of the OIC. Also, Babagida restore 
diplomatic relations with Israel which 
was another foreign policy action 
taken by the regime. It could be 
recalled that Nigeria, under the 
auspices of the OAU, had broken 
diplomatic ties with the State of Israel 
in 1973.Successive regimes since the 
mid 1970s adhered to the decision 
even though pressures to change the 
stance were piled on Nigeria (Fawole, 
2003), including the Buhari regime 
did not restore diplomatic ties with 
the State of Israel. 
 
Another difference is that General 
Buhari’s regime closed Nigeria’s 
borders with her immediate 
neighbours and equally changed the 
Nigerian currency which affected 
their survival. While the Babangida 
regime reopened Nigeria’s borders 
with her immediate neighbours and 
also gave them financial support. 
 
Domestically, the Babangida regime 
according to reports was said to have 
organized state sponsored terrorism 
through assassination of prominent 
Nigerians who frustrated   his regime. 
On the other hand, the Buhari military 
Junta suppressed the basic democratic 
rights, such as freedom of the press 
and freedom of speech. Equally, the 
Buhari regime never discussed the 
political future of Nigeria in terms of 
setting up a transition programme that 
will facilitate the return to democratic 
rule. While, the Babangida regime did 
set up a transition programme, but he 
(Babangida) deliberately subverted 
his own transition programme, when 
the June 12, 1993 presidential election 
was annulled. This undermined the 
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This paper takes a look at Nigeria’s 
foreign policy under two military 
juntas of Buhari and Babangida from 
December 31, 1983 to August 26, 
1993. It observes that when the 
Buhari regime came in power on 
December 31, 1983, it was more 
concerned with the Nigerian problems 
of corruption and indiscipline than 
with foreign policy. The regime came 
on board when Nigeria was faced with 
a depressed economy. In trying to 
revamp the deepening economic 
crisis, the Buhari regime closed 
Nigeria’s borders with her immediate 
neighbours such as Benin, Chad and 
Niger Republic and equally changed 
the Nigerian currency. This wrecked 
the economies of those neighbouring 
countries, because they depended on 
Nigeria for survival. The Buhari 
regime alsorecognized the Saharawi 
Arab Democratic Republic as an 
independent country in Africa. This 
diplomatic action rescued the OAU 
from collapse and Morocco’s 
blackmail. Buhari regime foreign 
policy with the West was based on 
retaliation reactions (tit-for-tat). The 
regime was terminated via a military 
coup on August 27,1985. 
 
The coming into being of the 
Babangida regime on August 27,1985 
made efforts to normalize friendly 
relations with Nigeria’s immediate 
neighbours. The closed borders were 
re-opened and the regime equally 
gave assistance to them and other 
African countries. Babangida foreign 
policy innovations led to the 
independence of Namibia, 
Mozambique and the majority rule in 
South Africa. The regime spent 
billions of US Dollars on ECOMOG 
to restore peace in the conflicting 
States of Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Politically, Babangida established two 
political parties, the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) and the 
National Republican Convention 
(NRC) to enable his military junta 
transmit power to a democratically 
elected government, but his military 
junta annulled the June 12, 1993 
presidential election in which Alhaji 
M.K.O Abiola emerged as the winner. 
This brought political tension in 
Nigeria, Babangida then step-aside as 
Nigeria’s military President on 
August 26, 1993. Therefore, both 
military juntas highly abused the 
fundamental human rights of 
Nigerians which dented the country’s 
image internationally. 
It is imperative to note that with the 
emergence of democracy in Nigeria in 
May, 1999, there was a new approach 
to Nigeria’s foreign policy. This 
paradigm shift was from an African-
focused to  a global-focused foreign 
policy, mostly at the economic level. 
Thus, Nigeria’s foreign policy was 
redirected to where she can get 
technical aid and developmental funds 
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